This paper offers a straightforward approach to test whether, and to what extent, stock market liquidity matters to the firm. We argue that because the role of an investment banking syndicate in a public security offering is analogous to that of a block trader, investment banks should charge lower fees to firms with more liquid securities. Using a large sample of seasoned equity offerings, we find that, ceteris paribus, investment banks' fees are substantially lower for firms with more liquid stock. This evidence provides an important link between stock market liquidity and a component of the firm's cash flows, a connection that has been heretofore elusive.
place the new issue and reduce these intermediation costs.
2 Since it should be easier to place an equity issue in a liquid market than to place it in an illiquid market, the stock market liquidity of the issuing firm should be an important determinant of the investment banking fees.
To test this hypothesis, we examine a sample of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We use this corporate transaction because it is intuitively appealing along many dimensions. First, the costs of raising external capital are large, and investment banking fees often represent the lion's share of the total flotation costs of a new issue. For example, Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao (1996) find that the average firm pays around seven percent of the total proceeds to raise capital through a seasoned equity offering (SEO). Investment banking fees are by far the largest portion of the flotation costs, representing over 76 percent of the total costs of raising external capital for SEOs. These fees also vary considerably-from less than one percent for some issues to up to 10 percent for others. Second, this transaction is pragmatic from a researcher's perspective because an active secondary market for the underlying securities already exists for the SEO shares. Thus, we are able to gauge both the effect on a component of the firm's cash flows (the investment bank fees) and the liquidity of the underlying shares. Unlike initial public offerings, in which investment banking fees tend to cluster and there is no pre-issue liquidity,
SEOs have an easily observable pre-issue liquidity as well as economically large fees, and there is considerable variation in both fees and liquidity. 3 Our results indicate that stock market liquidity is a major determinant of total investment banking fees (i.e., the gross spread or gross fees) in SEOs. We show that there is a surprisingly large and robust inverse relationship between the total fees paid to investment banks that bring 2 There is a vast literature, starting with Demsetz (1968) , which shows intermediation costs decline with liquidity. For example, LaPlante and Muscarella (1997) find that block trades have a lower price impact (one measure of how costly a trade is) when markets are more liquid. See O'Hara (1995) for an excellent survey. 3 See Chen and Ritter (2000) and Hansen (2001) for a discussion of clustering in IPO fees.
the securities to market and the liquidity of the stock of the issuing firm. Our finding is robust to each of the seven measures of liquidity we use in our analysis. Further, we show that these results are not only statistically significant, but are also economically meaningful. For instance, the average SEO fees for firms with high liquidity are more than 100 basis points lower than for those with low liquidity, ceteris paribus. These results are important because they highlight the economic significance of the effect of stock market liquidity on the cost of raising capital, thereby providing a link between firms' cash flows and the microstructure of financial markets.
Moreover, the effect of market liquidity on investment banking fees is stronger for large equity issues than for small issues. For large (top quintile of our sample) equity issues, the average difference in gross fees for liquid versus illiquid stocks, controlling for other factors, is 169 basis points per share issued. This difference represents 34 percent of the average gross fee for all the SEOs in our sample and 44.9 percent of the average gross fee for large SEOs. For small equity issues, the average difference in gross fees for liquid versus illiquid stocks, controlling for other factors, is 72 basis points. As a large issue is more difficult to place in an illiquid market than a small issue, this result suggests that the effects of liquidity on investment banking fees are stronger in those situations in which liquidity should matter the most and that the marginal cost of illiquidity is higher for large issues.
Our findings complement previous studies that examine the link between liquidity and firms' cost of capital. However, we are able to document that liquidity matters to the firm without relying upon any equilibrium asset pricing model. This is important because any test that attempts to demonstrate empirically an effect that liquidity may have on required returns is, of course, a joint test that liquidity is priced and that the asset pricing model the researcher uses is correct. Further, our results do not rely upon the assumption that expected returns, risk factors, and factor loadings are properly measured. 4 Overall, our paper shows that liquidity may affect firm value through its effect on the direct costs of raising capital. Rather than demonstrating an association between liquidity and discount rates, we document a connection between market liquidity and the firm's cash flowsparticularly, the flotation costs of raising additional capital. This is an important contribution because it suggests that the effects of liquidity on the value of the firm go beyond those predicted by existing theoretical models.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the potential determinants of investment bank fees. In Section 3 we discuss our data and sample construction.
Section 4 presents our empirical findings. Section 5 provides robustness tests for our results, and Section 6 concludes.
The Determinants of Investment Banking Fees
In this section, we discuss the various factors that may explain cross-sectional differences in investment bank fees in SEOs. Most studies examining investment bank fees have centered on initial public offerings (IPOs We argue that investment banks should charge lower (higher) fees to firms with more (less) liquid stocks. The rationale for this argument is that it should be easier for investment banks to place a SEO in a liquid market than to place it in an illiquid market. To test this hypothesis, we construct a variety of liquidity variables. While there is no unanimously accepted measure of market liquidity, frequently used proxies tend to be measures that gauge the transaction costs and ease of executing orders. In this paper, we use the following measures: (1) quoted spreads (2) relative spreads, (3) quoted depth, (4) average trade size, (5) volume, (6) turnover, and (7) an aggregate liquidity index (described in detail below).
Economies of scale with respect to issue size have been well-documented in SEOs. 6 Thus, we expect the cost of issuing equity to decline with the size of the offering, and so we control for issue size in all our tests. Further, we expect fees to increase with the opaqueness of the firm's assets. That is, it may be harder for investment banks to place shares that are fundamentally more difficult to value. In this study, we use the size of the firm as a proxy for the level of opacity or transparency. Further, since there is evidence that investment banks charge higher fees to riskier firms, we also control for the volatility of stock returns.
Another important factor that may affect the investment bank fees in SEOs is the reputation of the lead underwriter. Investment banks with better reputation may work harder during an SEO to ensure that the issue is successful. Thus, we expect gross fees to be positively related to the reputation of the underwriter. Following extant literature (e.g., Megginson and Weiss [1991] ), we use the annual market share of the lead manager as a proxy for reputation. It is assumed that book-runners with better reputation tend to have a larger market share.
We also expect the gross fee to decline with the level of coordination during an SEO.
That is, after controlling for other factors, we expect gross fees to be smaller in SEOs in which multiple book-runners are participating. The intuition is that multiple book-runners may be able to find investment banks for the selling and underwriting syndicates more efficiently than a single book-runner. We use a dummy variable that is equal to one if there are multiple bookrunners, and zero otherwise, to measure the level of coordination.
Finally, the level of the stock's price may be a factor as well. Institutional investors, who may be important investors in an SEO, tend to shun low-priced stocks. 
Variable Definitions
To measure the cost of issuing new equity, we use the dollar gross fee divided by the total proceeds. 10 The dollar gross fee is the difference between the price at which the underwriting syndicate buys shares from the issuing firm and the offer price for the shares. While the gross fee is the total compensation to the investment banking group doing the SEO, it is often comprised of three separate components: management fees, selling concession, and the underwriting fee.
The management fee is the amount per share that the lead investment bank, or bookrunner, receives for managing the deal; they get this amount for the full number of shares in the offering. The selling concession is the fee that investment banks in the selling group receive for lining up buyers and marketing the shares. This fee is determined on a per-share basis, and investment banks in the selling group receive this fee for each share they sell. This is usually the largest component of the gross fee (about 60 percent in our sample). Finally, the underwriting fee is the component of the gross fee that goes to the investment banks in the underwriting syndicate (again, on a per share basis for the shares that are allocated). The underwriting syndicate buys shares from the issuing firm and places them with the buyers lined up by the selling group. The buyers pay the offer price for the shares. The underwriting fee compensates for the modest amount of risk that the underwriting syndicate bears, as well as some of the expenses of the offering that are not directly reimbursed or paid for by the issuing firm.
Given the nature of these three components of the total investment banking fee, we expect liquidity to have the greatest effect on the part of the fee that most closely represents the investment banks market-making activity; that is, the selling concession. Thus, we will also refine our hypothesis above and argue that liquidity should have the largest effect on the selling concession component of the total investment banking fee.
To measure the market liquidity of the stock of the issuing firm, we use the following seven variables:
1. Quoted Spread: We construct this measure for each firm-month as the average difference between bid and ask prices over all quotations from the firm's primary exchange which occur during regular trading hours. We follow Weston (2000) in filtering the TAQ data for errors.
Specifically, we filter out quotations for which the ask is smaller than or equal to the bid price (crossed markets) or for which there is non-sequence warning flag on the Trades and Quotes (TAQ) database (stale quotes). Additionally, we remove all spreads greater than $5.00 and spreads that represent more than 20% of the quote midpoint (outliers). These filters affect less than one percent of the observations in our sample. The pre-offering spread is the time-series average of monthly quoted spreads over the six months prior to the offering date.
Relative spread:
This measure is constructed for all quotations as the quoted spread divided by the quote midpoint. The same filters are used as in the quoted spread.
Quoted depth:
This measure is the average number of shares offered at the bid and ask prices over all quotations using the same filters as in the quoted spread. 
Volume:
This variable is constructed from the CRSP database as the average monthly trading volume for the six months preceding the date of the offering. Since our sample contains NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq firms, the construction of trading volume presents some problems.
In dealer markets, trades are often immediately turned around by the market maker and thus double counted, making it hard to compare with volume in auction markets. Thus, we follow the common approach of dividing Nasdaq trading volume by two to correct for the double counting.
Turnover:
This measure is defined as the total monthly volume over the six months prior to the offering divided by number of shares outstanding, where Nasdaq volume is appropriately scaled.
11 It is important to note that the quoted depth on Nasdaq may be less informative than the quoted depth on the NYSE. This is due to the fact that the inside depth for Nasdaq stocks only represents the depth of the inside dealer, and not the aggregate market depth (as in NYSE or AMEX). Further, Nasdaq depth may have less variation due to the common practice of "auto-quoting" a depth of 1,000 shares. While there is no reason to suspect any systematic bias from Nasdaq quoted depths, we replicate our analysis using only data for NYSE and Amex stocks and our results are qualitatively similar.
Trade size:
This variable is the average number of shares traded over all eligible trades.
Liquidity Index:
The liquidity index (L i ) is constructed for each observation i = 1,…,N as:
where X i,k is the k th measure of liquidity (e.g., trading volume) for firm i in our sample. The rank function stacks each observation from least liquid to most liquid. That is, the stock with the highest trading volume gets a rank of N (most liquid) while the stock with the largest bid-ask spread has a rank of one (least liquid). By computing the cross-sectional rank of each observation within our sample, we create a uniform index for each liquidity measure, k. As such, we can then average the ranks of each observation across the K dimensions of liquidity. We then scale this average by the number of observations, N, so that our liquidity index varies between zero (least liquid) and one (most liquid). In this study, we use K=6 using all of the liquidity measures listed above. For example, a liquidity index measure of one implies the observation has the highest volume, turnover, trade size, and depth, and lowest quoted and relative spreads.
The advantage of this index is that it provides a balance between all of the liquidity measurespenalizing firms that may have high trading volume but also large spreads or that may have small spreads but also low depth, etc., while rewarding firms that have high measures across all dimensions.
12
To measure the level of firm transparency, we use return volatility and the market value of the issuing firm. The return volatility is measured as the standard deviation of daily returns over the six months prior to the offering date. The market value of the issuing firm is the average closing price times the number of shares outstanding over the six months prior to the offering date.
As a proxy for the reputation of the lead manager, we use the market share of the lead manager based on the entire SDC seasoned equity offerings database. The market share is constructed for each book-runner as the total principal value issued by each book-runner divided by the total principal amount of issues that year. Issues that have multiple book-runners are allocated 1/N to each book-runner for the construction of market shares. To proxy for the level of coordination in the SEO, we use a dummy variable that is equal to one if there are multiple book-runners and zero otherwise. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our sample firms. The average (median)
Summary Statistics
principal of the SEOs in our sample is equal to $130 million ($74 million). This amount represents approximately 11% (21%) of the market value of the average (median) firm in our sample. This indicates that the companies in our sample issue a significant amount of new equity during SEOs. This table also reports that the average (median) gross fee is equal to 4.8% (5%).
These gross fees are similar to the ones reported in other studies (see for example, Lee, et al.
[1996]). The average (median) management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession are equal to 0.99% (1%), 1.04% (1.04%), and 2.81% (2.93%), respectively. Notice that the selling concession is the largest component of the gross fee. This table also highlights significant crosssectional differences in our measures of liquidity. Finally, it is important to note that many our variables exhibit typical right-skewness (the median is below the mean). As a result, we use logtransformations in our analysis to mitigate any potential impact of outliers. The results presented in Table 2 show a negative relationship between liquidity level and investment banking fees. For each size decile, portfolios in the most liquid quintile have considerably smaller fees than those in the least liquid quintile. In all cases except the fourth size decile, the difference is statistically significant. Further, in all deciles there is a roughly monotonic relationship between the investment banking fees and our liquidity measures (these results also hold using the various measures of liquidity individually rather than the liquidity index).
Empirical Results

Univariate Results
It is important to mention that this pattern is not simply a result of inter-decile sorting.
That is, since liquidity is correlated with size, our results may be spurious if we have simply sorted the size decile portfolios into what are effectively inter-decile size quintiles. Note that for each size decile, the gross fee for the least liquid quintile is larger than the gross fees paid in the most liquid quintile for the next smallest size decile. For example, offerings in the most liquid quintile for size decile five paid an average investment banking fee of 4.52 percent (Table 2, Column 5, Row 5). However, while all offerings in size decile six (Table 2 , Row 6) are strictly larger than those in size decile five, offerings with the least liquidity paid an average of 5.14 13 We replicate this analysis by first splitting the sample into ten groups based on the decile ranking of the principal amount of the offering scaled by the pre-issue market value of equity. The results are qualitatively the same.
percent -a premium of 62 basis points relative to offerings in the most liquid quintile for size decile five.
Another interesting result that emerges from Table 2 is that the effect of market liquidity on investment banking fees appears stronger for large equity issues than for small issues. This result suggests that the effects of liquidity on investment bank fees are stronger in those situations in which liquidity should matter the most. Our interpretation is that it is relatively harder to place a large issue into an illiquid market than to place a small issue. These results are confirmed in our multivariate analysis, which we discuss in next sub-section.
Finally, there is evidence that riskier firms have higher costs of raising capital (see for example, Altinkilic and Hansen [2000] ). Thus, to ensure that the correlation between gross fees and liquidity is not due to differences in riskiness, we form portfolios by first splitting the sample into ten groups based on the decile ranking of the stock return volatility of the issuing firm.
Then, within each size decile, we form five portfolios based on the quintile ranking of the liquidity index. The results from this analysis are reported in Table 3 . The evidence in this table indicates that even after controlling for the riskiness of the issuing firm, there is a strong negative relationship between liquidity level and investment banking fees. Note that all the differences in gross fees between the most liquid firms and the least liquid firms are significantly different from zero at the one percent level. These results give us confidence that our main findings are not driven by the documented relation between risk and gross fees.
Multivariate Results
While the results presented in the preceding section suggest a relationship between stock market liquidity and the cost of issuing seasoned equity, these results may be misleading if there are confounding effects between liquidity and gross fees. For example, firms with highly liquid stocks also tend to be large, less risky firms with better access to high quality underwriters. In this section we re-examine the relationship between liquidity and gross fees, while controlling for these potential confounding effects in a multivariate regression framework.
As described in Section 2, we factor out confounding effects on fees by controlling for the size of the issue (principal amount), the share price, the level of asymmetric information and riskiness in the firm (proxied by return volatility and the market value of the issuer), the reputation of the lead investment bank (proxied by the market share of the lead manager), and the level of coordination in the SEO (proxied by a dummy variable that is equal to one if there are multiple book-runners, zero otherwise). We also include indicator variables for Nasdaq and Amex stocks to control for any market microstructure effects and year dummies to mitigate any time series variation in fees and hot issues markets (see Ritter [1984] and Lowry and Schwert Supporting the results from the univariate analysis, the results indicate that fees are strongly related to our liquidity measures, even after controlling for other factors. As predicted by our hypothesis that the costs of raising capital are lower for more liquid stocks, Table 4 shows that fees are positively related to quoted and relative bid-ask spreads, and negatively related to depth, average trade size, average volume, turnover, and our liquidity index variable. While these results demonstrate statistical significance, sub-section 4.4 explores the economic magnitude of the liquidity effect in greater detail.
The signs, magnitudes, and statistical significance of the coefficients on our control variables are roughly consistent across all the specifications. The regression coefficient on issue size (principal amount) is negative, which supports the idea that there are economies of scale in SEOs. Furthermore, consistent with the idea that fees increase with the opaqueness of the firm's assets, our results indicate that fees decline with firm size and increase with the volatility of stock returns.
We also find that investment banks with higher reputation charge higher fees. This is consistent with the idea that intermediaries are able to earn rents on their reputation. It is also consistent with investment banks with better reputation working harder during a SEO to ensure that the issue is successful. Finally, we find that fees are slightly lower for issues that have multiple lead managers. This result is consistent with the idea that multiple book-runners are able to place a new issue more efficiently than a single book-runner.
The Effect of Liquidity on the Different Gross Fee Components
As discussed above, the gross fees paid to the investment banking group are broken down into three components: the management fee, the selling concession, and the underwriting fee.
Since the selling concession has the closest parallel to market making costs, we expect liquidity to have a larger effect on this component of the fee. In this sub-section we examine how liquidity affects these different components of the gross fee. Table 5 reports results from regressions relating the different components of the gross fee-management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession-to the same explanatory variables used in the analysis in Table 4 . Consistent with the results in the previous section, we find that more liquid stocks have lower management fees, lower underwriting fees, and lower selling concessions. We also find that the signs, magnitudes, and statistical significance of the coefficients on our control variables (not reported) are all consistent with our findings presented in Table 4 .
The Economic Magnitude of the Effect of Liquidity on Investment Banking Fees
While the regression results point to a statistical relation between liquidity and investment banking fees, they also indicate economic significance. To gauge the economic magnitude of our results, we calculate the effect of a change from the fifth liquidity quintile (most liquid) to the first liquidity quintile (least liquid) on the gross fee and the different components of the gross fee. Since our estimation equation is specified in log-transformations for the dependent and independent variables, our regression coefficients may be interpreted as the elasticity of fees with respect to liquidity. As such, the magnitude of the effect on gross fees from a unit change in liquidity can be computed for the average firm in our sample. 14 Using the coefficients estimated in Tables 4 and 5 The results from this analysis are reported in Table 6 . The difference in fees for the low liquidity versus high liquidity stocks is substantial. For example, when we use the liquidity index measure as a proxy for the stock market liquidity of the issuing firm, the effect of a change 14 Since in our context ln( )
, it follows that a change in X has an effect on Y for the average firm approximately equal to Y X X β ∆ . from the fifth liquidity quintile (most liquid) to the first liquidity quintile (least liquid) on the gross fee is equal to 107 basis points, which represents a large percentage (about 22.3 percent) of the average gross fee in our sample. All of the liquidity variables have an economically large magnitude, with depth and trading volume having the largest effect. Overall, changes in the liquidity index have the largest effect on gross fees, consistent with our construction of this measure as a more comprehensive gauge of total liquidity.
As expected, Table 6 also shows that liquidity has a relatively modest effect on lowering the management fee component and the underwriting fee component of the gross fees. That is, most of the cost of illiquidity is reflected through the selling concession. This is consistent with our earlier argument that liquidity should have the greatest effect on the selling concession because it is the largest component of the gross fee and it is most closely related to the investment banks market-making activity. Overall, these results demonstrate an economically meaningful effect of liquidity on the direct cost of raising capital.
Results by Issue Size Quintile
There may be economies of scale in raising external capital (e.g., Lee, et al. [1996] ). Our results support this finding. However, our analysis above suggests that the effect of liquidity on fees is in turn related to the size of the issue. Especially large issues may be relatively harder to place into an illiquid market, requiring more effort from intermediaries which translates into proportionately larger fees. Simply put, the effect of liquidity on investment banking fees should be stronger where liquidity is needed most.
In order to test the hypothesis that the liquidity premium is largest for large issues, we replicate the analysis in Tables 4 and 5 allowing the effect of liquidity on the investment banking fee to change with the size of the offering. To accomplish this, we construct five dummy variables equal to one if the offering size is in the n th size quintile based on the total principal amount of the offering. We then test the hypothesis that the effect of liquidity on investment banking fees ( β ) is equal across each size quintile ( 1 2 3 4   5 , , , β β β β = β ).
We present the results of this analysis in Table 7 . As expected, we find that the magnitude of the liquidity effect increases monotonically with size for both the gross fee and for the selling concession portion of the fee. However, the liquidity effect is much stronger for the largest size quintile. In fact, for gross fees (as well as for each component of the fee) we are able to reject the joint hypothesis that the liquidity effect in the largest size quintile is the same as in the other quintiles. 15 Further, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the first four size quintiles are equal. In sum, our evidence suggests that the liquidity premium is non-linear with respect to size and is greatest for the largest quintile of offerings.
As in section 4.4, we also compute the economic magnitude of the measured liquidity effect by size quintile. Table 8 presents the equivalent analysis as in Table 6 based on our liquidity index and broken out for each size quintile. These results confirm what the regression results suggested -that liquidity matters the most where it is most needed. For example, we find that issues in the largest size quintile in our sample pay a 169 basis point premium for being in the worst liquidity quintile compared to the best liquidity quintile. The parallel effect for the smallest issues in our sample is 72 basis points which, while large, is less than half the magnitude for large issues. 
Matched Sample Technique
The regression results presented in Section 4 show a negative relation between stock market liquidity and various measures of liquidity. However, these results may be spurious if there are strong nonlinearities between liquidity and our control variables. For example, since liquidity is correlated with firm size, issue size, share price, and volatility, it may be that our measures of liquidity proxy for some non-linearity in the relationship. To mitigate this potential misspecification, we estimate the effect of liquidity on investment banking fees using a matched sample methodology. For each observation, we find another SEO in our sample that closely resembles that observation in price, offer size, and volatility (standard deviation of stock returns).
After matching the firms, we examine how the differences in the liquidity index between the sample and matching firms affect the investment banking fees. The advantage of this procedure is that we are comparing observations in our sample that, ideally, differ only in their liquidity. As a result, inferences concerning differences in the investment banking fees should be independent of the functional relationship between these measures and size, price, or total risk.
The results from this analysis (not reported) suggest that the relationship we document is not a product of non-linearities. Consistent with our previous results, we find that more liquid stocks (measured by the liquidity index) pay lower investment banking fees and bring seasoned issues to market more quickly. 
Alternative Specifications
In this sub-section we examine the sensitivity of the results reported in the previous sections to our choice of control variables. We accomplish this by re-estimating the regressions in our paper including additional controls for asymmetric information and risk (dummy variable for analyst coverage, R&D scaled by assets, net fixed assets scaled by assets), profitability (return on assets), investment opportunities (market-to-book ratio), momentum effects (lagged returns), and other firm characteristics (debt-to-equity ratio). We find that our previous results are insensitive to these alternative specifications. Overall, the inclusion of various firm-specific factors has no qualitative effect on either the statistical or economic magnitude of our results.
Additional Sensitivity Checks
Apart from firm-specific factors that could confound our results, there may also be systematic relations between liquidity and investment banking fees driven by time trends in either liquidity or gross fees. For example, both liquidity and the cost of raising capital may be improving over our sample period. As a result, we want to be sure that our results are not simply driven by time trends in our variables. To this end, we replicate the analysis in our paper for the following four time sub-samples: 1993-1994, 1995-1996, 1997-1998, and 1999-2000. Consistent with our previous results (both statistically and economically), we find that investment banks charge lower fess to firms with better liquidity in each of the four two-year periods. This evidence indicates that our main results are not driven by time series patterns in liquidity and gross fees.
Conclusion
One of the most important current issues in the market microstructure literature is whether liquidity affects firm value. Contributing to this literature, this paper presents empirical evidence that a firm's stock market liquidity can have a direct effect on the firm's cash flows.
By examining a large sample of seasoned equity offerings, we are able to measure both the direct cost of raising capital (the investment banking fees) as well as the market liquidity of the underlying stock prior to the offering. Consistent with the idea that investment banks play a market-making role (essentially the role of a large-block trader) in placing a seasoned offering, we find that firms with better market liquidity come to market faster and pay significantly lower investment banking fees.
Our results are economically significant. We estimate that the effect of a change from the most liquid quintile to the least liquid quintile on the gross fee, controlling for other factors, is approximately 107 basis points, which represents about 22.3 percent of the average gross fee in our sample. We also find that this effect is stronger for large equity issues, suggesting that the marginal cost of illiquidity is higher for large issues.
This paper provides an important link between market microstructure effects and corporate financial decisions. We find that stock market liquidity is an important determinant of firms' ability to access external capital markets. Our results imply that firms have an incentive to promote improvements in their stock market liquidity, as it can support their ability to raise capital. Together with the literature on liquidity premiums in asset prices, our results underscore the economic importance of capital-market microstructure issues such as regulation, optimal market design, and competition. To the extent that better market microstructure can improve liquidity, it may also improve firms' ability to raise capital.
Table 1 Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for our sample firms. Our sample consists of all seasoned equity offerings listed on the Securities Data Company's Global New Issues database over the period 1993-2000 that satisfy the following criteria: a) the company is not a financial institution (SIC codes 6000 through 6999); b) the size of the offering is greater than $20 million; c) the company is present in both the CRSP and TAQ databases; d) the company has at least six months of transaction data prior to the seasoned equity offering; e) the offering is a firm commitment; and f) the offering is not a shelf registration. All firm characteristics are constructed for a period of six months prior to the offering date. The market value of equity, share price, turnover, and volume reflect average monthly figures from CRSP. Return volatility is constructed as the standard deviation of daily returns. Relative and quoted bid-ask spreads, quoted depth, and average trade size are collected from the TAQ database and reflect average monthly figures. The liquidity index is constructed as the average scaled cross-sectional ranking over six measures of liquidity (quoted and relative bid-ask spreads, volume, share turnover, average trade size, and average depth at the bid and ask prices). The more liquid the stock, the larger the liquidity index. Investment banking fees are collected from the SDC database. 
Sample description Firm Characteristics
Table 2 Gross Investment Banking Fees by Size-Liquidity Portfolios
This table describes the gross investment banking fee for seasoned equity offerings by quintile of liquidity, conditional on the size decile of the offering. Portfolios are created by forming size decile portfolios based on the size of the offering. Five portfolios are then formed within each size portfolio based on the quintile of the liquidity index. Each portfolio contains 47 or 48 observations. The liquidity index is constructed as the average scaled cross-sectional ranking over six measures of liquidity (quoted and relative bid-ask spreads, volume, share turnover, average trade size, and average depth at the bid and ask prices). The more liquid the stock, the larger the liquidity index. Investment banking fees and the principal amount of the offering are collected from the SDC database. Average gross fees are constructed as the equally weighted mean spread within each size-liquidity portfolio. All firm characteristics are constructed for a period of six months prior to the offering date. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Table 3 Gross Investment Banking Fees by Stock Return Volatility-Liquidity Portfolios
This table describes the gross investment banking fee for seasoned equity offerings by quintile of liquidity, conditional on the volatility decile of the offering. Portfolios are created by forming volatility decile portfolios based on the sock volatility of the issuing firm. Five portfolios are then formed within each size portfolio based on the quintile of the liquidity index. Each portfolio contains 47 or 48 observations. Stock return volatility is constructed as the standard deviation of daily returns. The liquidity index is constructed as the average scaled crosssectional ranking over six measures of liquidity (quoted and relative bid-ask spreads, volume, share turnover, average trade size, and average depth at the bid and ask prices). The more liquid the stock, the larger the liquidity index. Investment banking fees and the principal amount of the offering are collected from the SDC database. Average gross fees are constructed as the equally weighted mean spread within each size-liquidity portfolio. All firm characteristics are constructed for a period of six months prior to the offering date. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. where the Investment Bank Gross Fee is the percent of the SEO proceeds paid to investment banks (the percentage gross fee), Liquidity refers to one of seven liquidity measures described below and Controls represents a vector containing the following factors: principal amount, market value of equity, share price, past stock performance, return volatility, lead manager reputation, multiple book-runners indicator, Amex and Nasdaq indicators, and year dummies. The market value of equity, share price, turnover, and volume reflect average monthly figures from CRSP. Return volatility is constructed as the standard deviation of daily returns. Relative and quoted bid-ask spreads, quoted depth, and average trade size are collected from the TAQ database and reflect average monthly figures. The liquidity index is constructed as the average scaled cross-sectional ranking over six measures of liquidity (quoted and relative bid-ask spreads, volume, share turnover, average trade size, and average depth at the bid and ask prices). The more liquid the stock, the larger the liquidity index. Investment banking fees are collected from the SDC database. Lead manager reputation is the market share of the lead manager. Multiple book indicator is equal to one if there are multiple book-runners, zero otherwise. Amex and Nasdaq indicators are based on the primary listing of the firms' shares. All firm characteristics are constructed for a period of six months prior to the offering date. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. where the Investment Bank Gross Fee is the percent of the SEO proceeds paid to investment banks (the percentage gross fee), Liquidity Index is the average scaled cross-sectional ranking over six measures of liquidity (quoted and relative bid-ask spreads, volume, share turnover, average trade size, and average depth at the bid and ask prices),
Size Quintile j I = is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue belongs is in the size quintile j, zero otherwise, and Controls represents a vector containing the following factors: principal amount, market value of equity, share price, past stock performance, return volatility, lead manager reputation, multiple book-runners indicator, Amex and Nasdaq indicators, and year dummies. The market value of equity, share price, turnover, and volume reflect average monthly figures from CRSP. Return volatility is constructed as the standard deviation of daily returns. Relative and quoted bid-ask spreads, quoted depth, and average trade size are collected from the TAQ database and reflect average monthly figures. Investment banking fees are collected from the SDC database. Lead manager reputation is the market share of the lead manager. Multiple book indicator is equal to one if there are multiple book-runners, zero otherwise. Amex and Nasdaq indicators are based on the primary listing of the firms' shares. All firm characteristics are constructed for a period of six months prior to the offering date. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Superscripts a, b, and c denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable
Gross fee Management Fee
Underwriting Fee
Selling concession
Liquidity Index Coefficient
(1) (2) (3) This figure presents a scatter plot of gross investment banking fees for seasoned equity offerings against the size of the offering. Our sample consists of all seasoned equity offerings listed on the Securities Data Company's Global New Issues database over the period 1993-2000 that satisfy the following criteria: a) the company is not a financial institution (SIC codes 6000 through 6999); b) the company is present in both the CRSP and TAQ databases; c) the company has at least six months of transaction data prior to the seasoned equity offering; d) the offering is a firm commitment; and e) the offering is not a shelf registration. 
